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ABSTRACT
The UK government has consistently claimed to be ‘following the science’ in its
approach to the pandemic but this claim conceals complex and shifting
entanglements of politics and science. The instability of the relationship
between politics and science became increasingly visible around the unequal
vulnerability of racialized minorities to infection and death from Covid-19.
How and when Black and other minoritized deaths matter has become the
focus of UK governmental efforts to delay and deflect, in what has been
claimed to be the ‘best country in the world to be a black person’. Rather
than the rule of Science, what the pandemic reveals are the conjunctural
contested articulations of science(s) and politics.
KEYWORDS Science; politics; ‘race’; ‘BAME’ deaths; conjuncture
This is an unprecedented global pandemic and we have taken the right steps at
the right time to combat it, guided at all times by the best scientific advice.
(UK Government spokesperson quoted in the Guardian, 22 May 2020, p. 15)
Covid-19 has been both universal and particular: it has connected places
around the world in new configurations, breaking established flows and
installing new ones. Responses to it have taken distinct national and local
forms as governments attempt to manage, control or even ignore the
threats to their populations. Here I concentrate on some of the particular pol-
itical-cultural dynamics of the United Kingdom (while recognizing that its
different constituent nations have taken some diverging routes). In particular,
I focus on the relationship between science and politics in the response to the
pandemic, the racialized inequalities of vulnerability and their interweaving
with the insistent claim that ‘Black Lives Matter’.
The pandemic – and governmental reactions to it – have evoked many
critical responses. Perhaps one of the most far-reaching is Giorgio Agamben’s
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claim that ‘the threshold that separates humanity from barbarism has been
crossed’. He argued that this transition results from the drive of science to
‘split the unity of our vital experience, which is always inseparably bodily
and spiritual, into a purely biological entity on one hand and an affective
and cultural life on the other.’ This spilt has been enabled by ‘The Church
above all, which, in making itself the handmaid of science, which has now
become the true religion of our time, has radically repudiated its most essen-
tial principles.’ (2020, p. 4). In the UK, as the opening quotation shows, the
claim to be ‘following the science’ has been a recurring theme of the govern-
ment’s approach. This would appear to confirm Agamben’s view of the pan-
demic as enabling the rule of the ‘religion of science’.
And yet, I am troubled by two things. First, my experience of the corona-
virus lockdown feels strangely different to Agamben’s: mine has featured
contestation, controversy, outrage and diverse social and political responses.
Second, it is not long since attention was being focused on the rise of an anti-
intellectual populism in Europe and parts of the Americas. This odd conjunc-
tion makes me wonder – and worry – about excessively abstracted con-
ceptions of both science and politics in the face of their currently shifting
articulations. Four years ago, many people (including me) were exploring
the crystallization of contemporary populist politics around ‘anti-expertise’
and ‘anti-science’ arguments in favour of the wisdom of common sense.
The position was crisply expressed by the UK Brexit enthusiast and MP
Michael Gove in his claim that ‘The British People have had enough of
experts’ (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/10/michaelgoves-
guide-to-britains-greatest-enemy-the-experts; see also Clarke and Newman
2017). In many places, the emergence of what Maskovsky and Bjork-James
(2019) have called ‘angry politics’ was accompanied by a distinctive strain
of ‘epistemological populism’ whose continuing effects remain unevenly
visible, in Jair Bolsanoro’s Brazil or in the daily psychodrama of Donald
Trump’s fraught relationship with expertise. Yet in the UK, those politicians
who once formed the avant-garde of anti-elitist ‘common-sense’ have con-
sistently claimed to be ‘Following the Science’ during this current crisis.
1. Entangling science and politics
This performative deployment of Politics doing the bidding of Science, as if
both formations were coherent and singular objects, was recurrently
accompanied by a manly rhetoric of ‘Having a Plan’ (often associated with
‘straining every sinew’ or ‘working day and night’ to make it come true).
However, this proclaimed unity of science and politics became increasingly
unsettled, pulled in different and diverging directions (see Bacevic 2020).
Instead, we saw the increasingly fraught entangling of science and politics,
with politicians claiming to be merely ‘following the science’ while scientists
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complained about being put into a ‘political situation’. At one point, Prime
Minister Johnson refused to allow government scientists to answer what he
defined as ‘political questions’, specifically about the conduct of his special
advisor, Dominic Cummings, in relation to the lockdown rules advocated
by the scientists. Among the emerging tangles were:
. The heightened public visibility of science as plural, contestable and
incomplete;
. A combative assertion of the ‘scientific method’ as involving errors, doubts,
arguments and probability;
. The sudden disappearance of international comparativemortality datawhen
it became clear that the UK was ‘world beating’ in its failures (Jones 2020);
. A proliferation of sciences and scientists, and a complex dynamic of
inclusion and exclusion of types of science;
. A renewed enthusiasm for those sciences clustered around ‘techno-deter-
minism’ as the solution to our troubles (for example, in contact tracing)
and the relative absence of ‘social’ sciences;
. And, not least, shifts in which modes of knowledge are valued or excluded.
For example, ‘experience’ based knowledge rarely appears in the policy
process but had profoundly disruptive effects in news reports which juxta-
posed governmental claims about Protective Personal Equipment (PPE)
and accounts from front line workers.
These shifting configurations feel very different from the conception of
Science and Politics on offer in a range of critical approaches – in which, to
put it crudely, everything is political and needs to be revealed as such. Collec-
tively, we have demystified Science, Scientism and the dominant apparatuses
of knowledge, justification and calculation – the power-knowledge couplings
of our age. But this foundational view of things being political makes it
difficult to explore the specific and shifting conjunctural articulations of poli-
tics and science.
2. Who gets to die?
Despite governmental claims that ‘we are all in this together’ (an established
Conservative trope), COVID-19 turned out to be anything but an even-
handed pandemic. Rather, its impact has been profoundly unequally distrib-
uted: in the UK, it has disproportionately affected older people, poor people,
people working in low paid but ‘essential’ occupations (from health and social
care to the food chain), and people who are not ‘white British’ (in census cat-
egory terms). These are, obviously, not separate categories: racialized min-
orities in the UK are more likely to live in poverty, to be concentrated in
low paid employment and form a disproportionately large part of the
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health care and social care workforces. Their vulnerability to the virus forms
an all too predictable outcome of a pandemic traversing the biopolitics of
a racially structured capitalist social formation. This is hardly unique to the
UK, but there are distinctively national features of how such biopolitics are
translated into policies, practices and, not least, systematic political amnesia.
These unevenly distributed deaths came to public – and eventually politi-
cal – attention at the intersection of two dynamics: first, the distinctively
urban concentrations of the early weeks of the UK pandemic (London and
urban centres in the West and East Midlands, all with significant racialized-
minoritized populations) and second, the astonishingly visible – literally
through the regular publication of their photographs – deaths of ‘front
line’ health and care workers who were disproportionately ‘not white
British’. As a result, the country became familiar with a distinctive acronym:
these were ‘BAME [Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic] deaths’. Politicians,
health experts, newsreaders and journalists struggled to sound confident in
deploying this term which had emerged as a government nomenclature to
manage the problem of naming the UK’s many Others, offering a broad cat-
egory, rather than multiple racialized ethnicities. It remains a contested term
and has not been adopted as an active identity or form of self-naming (see
inter alia, Aspinall 2002, Okolosie et al. 2015). But as an administrative cat-
egory, it provided a way of naming evident coronavirus-related inequalities.
As news reports and comments by health workers multiplied, a picture of
systemically skewed mortality rates emerged. Alongside – and interwoven
with – other problems in pandemic governance (e.g. the slow and inadequate
supply of PPE to health and social care workers), a story began to take shape
about whowas dying fromCOVID-19, centring on its disproportionate concen-
tration among racialized minorities. By the beginning of May 2020, reviews of
mortality rates indicated systematic differences (e.g. the Centre for Evidence
Based Medicine 2020). The government eventually established an inquiry
into BAME death rates. Its report revealed what was already known – and
indeed had precipitated the call for an inquiry in the first place: BAME
people were dying disproportionately from Covid-19. The report (PHE
2020a) showed that BAME people were twice as likely as white people to
die after contracting Covid-19 but was greeted with an angry response for
its failure to address the causes of the disparities or propose solutions.
After many critical reactions – ranging from the Muslim Council of Great
Britain to the British Medical Association – the government agreed to
publish a range of responses and suggestions collected during the consul-
tations undertaken to produce the original report (PHE 2020b). This report
was published to relatively greater approval, not least for acknowledging
the possibility that ‘historic racism’ and ‘social inequality’might be contribut-
ing factors to BAME mortality rates, and the government faced demands that
its recommendations be implemented immediately. In a strange side-step,
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the government called the report ‘a descriptive summary of stakeholder
insights into the factors that may be influencing the impact of COVID-19
on BAME communities and strategies for addressing inequalities’ and
announced that it would be taken forward via a further review to be led by
Equalities Minister, Kemi Badenoch. To many, this looked like yet another
postponement, a strategy wholly in keeping with established governmental
responses to questions about systemic or institutional racism.
3. When do Black lives matter?
By this point, the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers on
May 25th had triggered new Black Lives Matter protests in the US, UK and
well beyond. In the process, the issue of BAME coronavirus deaths became
folded into a wider politics of ‘race’ and death. As many recognized,
George Floyd’s last words struck uncanny echoes in the moment of corona-
virus: ‘I can’t breathe’ conjoined different forms of systemically racialized
oppression and vulnerability (see, for example, Okri 2020). In the UK, it con-
nected health inequalities with mobilizations around symbols of colonial
history, the continuing effects of the UK’s ‘hostile environment’ policies
directed at migrants (Gentleman 2019) and the contemporary policing of
black and other racialized communities (involving, for example, the use of
stop and search powers or Tasers). However, in a parliamentary debate,
Kemi Badenoch (the Minister for Equality) insisted that:
[L]et us not in this House use statements like ‘being black is a death sentence’,
which young people out there hear, don’t understand the context and then
continue to believe that they live in a society that is against them. When actually
this is one of the best countries in the world to be a black person. (Brewis 2020)
This response was greeted with some scepticism, and suspicions about the
government’s framing of BAME deaths intensified when the Prime Minister
announced a new wider investigation: a Commission on Race and Ethnic Dis-
parities. The announcement provoked outrage for several reasons. One was
its effective postponement of any immediate action in the current crisis. A
second was the catalogue of previous investigations, studies and reports in
which racialized inequalities had been reviewed, but with little or no effect
on policy or practice (see, inter alia, Lammy 2020). A third was that the gov-
ernment advisor made responsible for establishing the new Commission
(Munira Mirza) had previously insisted that claims of ‘institutional racism’
were ‘a perception more than a reality’ and that anti-racist lobby groups
and diversity policies encouraged people to ‘see everything through the
prism of racial difference’ (Stone 2020).
The evidence about unequal infection and death rates for Black and other
racialized-minoritized groups has been firmly – and, indeed, multiply –
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established. What remains contested is how to account for these inequalities,
with diverse explanatory frameworks swirling around. Some of these cluster
in the realm of the biological: BAME groups have higher levels of ‘co-morbid-
ities’ (diabetes, cardiovascular disease) and may also have lower levels of
Vitamin D which may increase vulnerability to infection. And, not surprisingly,
a search continues for the mysterious and elusive ‘genetic factor’ that may
account for differences (as scientific racism makes another comeback: Saini
2019). A second cluster forms around what might be called the socio-cultural
sphere, noting that BAME groups tend to live in overcrowded households in
more densely populated areas; many live in multi-generational households
and practise communal behaviours (from eating to worship) that may con-
tribute to virus transmission. Some also have purported cultural ‘flaws’
(such as poor English language skills) that allegedly make them immune to
public health messages rather than the virus.
This cluster slides into a third which offers a more structural sense of
inequality, though often couched in administrative terminology: deprivation,
poverty, unequal access to public goods such as housing, health, education
and what might be called ‘situational racisms’ (in workplaces, on the
streets, etc.) and the effects of what PHE carefully called ‘historic [i.e. as
opposed to contemporary] racism’. Finally, individuals and organizations
have increasingly demanded attention to the place of institutional, systemic
or structural racism in organizing the lives and deaths of these groups.
However, it seems likely that prolonged governmental processes of quantify-
ing, acknowledging and denying will bracket the question of whether Black
lives matter for the foreseeable future.
4. Which racism is this?
The first report from the government’s Race Disparity Unit in October 2020
reasoned its way delicately around the question of racism and its effects,
arguing that
After taking into account the COVID-19mortality rate in each local authority, con-
trolling for population density, and adjusting for deprivation and socioeconomic
position, household composition and occupational exposure, health and disabil-
ity at the time of the 2011 Census – the excess risk of mortality from COVID-19
comparedwith that of theWhite ethnic groupwas reduced for all ethnicminority
groups, especially for Black and the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic
groups. (RDU 2020: 54 – pages unnumbered in original; my emphasis)
This idiosyncratic view of an ‘excess’ that might be associated with racism
after all manner of other socio-economic dynamics have been taken into
account both deflects and defers the question of what racism is and how it
works. By contrast, arguments about structural racism view ‘population
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density, deprivation, and socioeconomic position, household composition
and occupational exposure, health and disability’ as intimately and intrinsi-
cally connected to the racialised dynamics of the society. A rather different
report, commissioned by the Labour Party from Baroness Doreen Lawrence,
argued that:
Covid-19 has thrived on structural inequalities that have long scarred British
society. Black and minority ethnic people are more likely to work in frontline
or shutdown sectors, more likely to live in poor quality or overcrowded
housing and more likely to face barriers to accessing healthcare. Biological
factors do not explain the disparity in deaths and infections; Black, Asian and
minority ethnic people have been overexposed to this virus.
… Throughout this review, we heard a real sense of frustration that despite the
causes of racial inequality being well known, and report after report making rec-
ommendations on how to tackle it, little action has been taken. Over the last
three years, therehavebeennumerousGovernment-led reviews,whichhave cumu-
latively made over 200 recommendations which could significantly change the
experiences of Black, Asian and minority ethnic people in the UK. Yet few of these
recommendations have been taken forward effectively. (Lawrence 2020, pp. 24–25)
Forms of knowledge, in this context as in others, have both political affilia-
tions and effects: they are consequential. But these are rarely simple alignments:
they shift and they require political work to establish and stabilize their articula-
tions. In the end, I think attention to the conjunctural entanglements of science
and politics are more productive than epochal statements about our condition,
such as Agamben’s. Better to think about the shifting alignments ofwhat counts
as political and non-political (including ‘Science’), following Rancière’s sugges-
tive observation that ‘politics is a way of re-partitioning the political from the
non-political’ (2011, p. 4). This boundary is a necessarily mobile and contested
one, where we encounter the articulations of knowledge, power and politics
in shifting – and contested – formations. A Foucauldian conception of power/
knowledge in which forms of power are constructed, legitimized, and enacted
in specific assemblagesof agents, practices and technologies offers a productive
framing, especially when different forms are viewed as overlaid and articulated
(e.g. Isin and Ruppert 2020). However, this needs to be supplemented by a con-
junctural view of such shifting formations which explores the ways in which
articulations of knowledge, power and politics are always particular to specific
moments of time–space – as are the challenges and contestations that they
encounter (Newman and Clarke 2018).
Both Covid-19 and the responses to George Floyd’s killing have reminded
everyone (with some notable exceptions) about the entangled character of
the world and where we live and die. But they have also reminded us about
the continuing salience of national spaces – including the contradictory roles
occupied by national governments and their involvement in political mobiliz-
ation and de-mobilization. For me, that means giving attention to the
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overlapping and accumulating crises, contradictions, constructions and con-
testations that create what Gramsci – in a compelling image – called ‘a series
of unstable equilibria’. In those unsettling dynamics, established formations of
knowledge, power and politics are also at stake. At such moments, ‘race’ and
the politics of (not) knowing form vital points of connection and disjuncture
among the different social forces that are being mobilized (or immobilized).
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